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Abstract 
This paper sheds light on possible explanations for the growth and endurance of the 
piquetero social movement in Argentina, developed from a comparative perspective 
based on Latin America.  I show which institutional arrangements, political actors, and 
configurations of power contributed to the success of the piqueteros.  Applying the basic 
principles of the rational choice approach, I find that the success of the piquetero 
movement was produced by the current political division in the ruling party (the 
Peronist party), by the over-regulated Argentine labor market, and by the impact of the 
Argentine economic crisis through the unemployment rates. 
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OVERVIEW 
Among the Latin American countries, only in Argentina did a social movement of 
well-organized unemployed people, called piqueteros, emerge in the middle of the 1990s.1  
Piqueteros, organized in several autonomous associations, claim social assistance from the 
Argentine government in the form of temporary jobs, special subsidies, and food assistance. 
The piquetero movement is split into several organizations, of which seven are the most 
important.2  To achieve their goals, they have organized several massive protests in the main 
cities of Argentina, which have led to the occupation of squares, avenues, public buildings, 
and business premises.  To achieve these goals, the organizations of piqueteros have been 
able to incorporate a number of members by providing them with food and subsidies thanks 
to the social programs Trabajar and Planes Jefe y Jefa de Familia (Lobato & Suriano, 
2003; Weitz-Shapiro, 2006).3   
This paper sheds light on possible explanations for the success and sustainability of 
the piquetero social movement in Argentina, developed from a comparative perspective 
based on Latin America.  The selection of Latin America as a framework for comparison 
allows us to achieve valuable conclusions due to the use of a relatively large range of 
countries.  At the same time, because of similarities among Latin American countries in 
                                                
1 Iván Schneider and Rodrigo Conti (2003) claim that the first important piquetes (occupation of roads or 
avenues) occurred in the middle of 1995.  Maristella Svampa & Sebastián Pereyra (2003), however, claim that 
the piqueteros movement acquired a solid organization only after 1997. I also use the definition of a social 
movement taken from John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1987) which states, a social movement is a set of 
opinions and beliefs in a population representing preferences for changing some elements of the social structure 
or reward redistribution, or both, of a society. 
2 See Table 2. 
3 The Programa Trabajar was a temporary unemployment relief program that was in place between 1996 and 
2002. In May 2002, Trabajar replaced by a more extensive program called Planes Jefes y Jefas de Familia. 
Thus, the less than a quarter of a million beneficiaries of the program Trabajar was increased to 
approximately two millions the program Planes Jefes y Jefas de Familia was created (Galasso and Ravallion, 
2003). The Planes Jefes y Jefas de Familia was created in the midst of the 2002 crisis. It was the first 
universal unemployment subsidy policy in more than 25 years.  
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terms of their culture and their economic and political development, I will be able to isolate 
and determine more clearly the impact of some variables on the growth and endurance of the 
piquetero movement. 
Within this comparative framework, the piquetero movement is part of major trend in 
social movement activity in the region, largely focused on demands that are specific and 
territorially based; not on structural changes.  Following this tendency, the piquetero 
movement did not demand significant structural changes in the Argentine government.  
Structural demands such as a nationalization of oil and other energy resources, a broad 
default on all external debts, a constitutional assembly, and a change towards a socialist 
regime have remained purely rhetorical and excluded from any negotiation with the 
Argentine executive.   
On the contrary, the piquetero movement has established a mutually beneficial 
relationship with political actors in the Argentine executive branch.  In this paper, I present 
and analyze the institutional dynamics of this mutually beneficial relationship.  Other Latin 
American movements that have established cooperative relationships with the state do not 
present these particular institutional dynamics and mechanisms of the piquetero movement. 
The presence of these dynamics -- characterized by the division of the ruling party, the 
federal government, and the movement into two competing factions -- makes the growth and 
endurance of the piquetero movement a fascinating case in the region. 
Because of the presence of this supportive relationship between the piquetero 
movement and the Argentine executive, and the way in which this relationship was 
developed and structured, the current literature on social movements does not provide us with 
an accurate and complete framework to fully understand the conditions and reasons behind 
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the growth and endurance of the piquetero movement.  As McCarthy and Wolfson state 
(1992), cooptation for social movements tends to happen locally, at regional levels, or only 
for certain infrastructural locations. Cooptation of national-level movements by state actors 
tends to be rare and all these types of movements tend to be short-lived.4   The piquetero 
movement is not only a national-level movement, but also one that has remained alive and 
considerably strong for a relatively long period (since 1995).  All these features make the 
piquetero movement a fascinating case for analysis.  This paper attempts to offer an 
explanation in order to fill this gap in the literature and account for the success of the 
piquetero movement.   
In order to explain the growth and endurance of the piquetero movement, one set of 
possible explanations focuses on economic factors such as the economic crisis, the high 
unemployment rates, and the lack of flexibility of the Argentine labor market.  The other set 
focuses on political factors such as the relationship between the piquetero movement and 
labor unions, and the cooptation of the piquetero movement by the Argentine state in a 
somewhat mutually beneficial relationship.  
After discussing the limitations of the economic explanations, I turn to evaluate the 
effect of the political and cultural factors that triggered and shaped this social phenomenon.  
After a selective comparison of all these factors, I find that the features of the political 
interaction between the piquetero movement and the Argentine state are critical not only to 
understand the case at hand, but also to develop generalizable theories for predicting the 
growth of this kind of movement elsewhere in Latin America.  Thus, the study of this case 
                                                
4  These features are even valid for movements that find widespread support for their goals and little or no 
organized opposition from the population of a geographic community. These movements are much more likely 
to be co-opted by state structures. 
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potentially provides us with a new framework to evaluate and fully understand the growth 
and endurance of social movements with mutually beneficial relationships with politicians, 
bureaucrats, or institutions of the Latin American states. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS (THE CONTEXT) 
The Latin American debt crisis and the 1980s recession, caused by the exhaustion of 
the import substitution model of the previous decades coupled with excessive international 
lending, triggered a process of economic liberalization throughout the region that modified 
both the political strategies and industrial bargaining power of organized labor (Collier, 
1979; Levitsky & Way, 1998).  In an effort to successfully address the crisis, most Latin 
American countries began opening their economies and adjusting their states through 
privatization, deregulation, and decentralization in the 1990s (Cox Edwards, 1997).  The 
level of unemployment in the region that had begun to increase during the 1980s recession 
peaked due to privatizations negative effect (Birch & Haar, 2000).  Table 1 shows the 
evolution of urban unemployment in several countries of the region during the 1990s (see 
the Appendix). 
Several countries reached high rates of urban unemployment such as Argentina, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Colombia during this period.  Although Argentina registered a 
high level of unemployment in 1995 when the piquetero emerged, it is also possible to find 
other Latin American countries with similarly high rates, such as Colombia in 1998 or 1999 
or Nicaragua in 1993, 1994, and 1995 during the same decade.  However, no other country in 
Latin America has experienced the growth of a well-organized social movement of 
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unemployed people.  Thus, high unemployment rates cannot entirely explain the growth and 
endurance of the piqueteros in Argentina. 
The level of social discontent in Argentina was also triggered by an economic 
recession in 1995.  The Argentine GDP fell 4.2 percentage points in that year, when the 
social movement emerged.  Nevertheless, during the recovery, with growth rates of 4.8 and 
8.6 respectively in 1996 and 1997, the piquetero movement continued to grow (Parodi, 2003; 
Lobato & Suriano, 2003).  The kind of short economic recession that occurred in Argentina 
in 1995 is common in any economy, but in no other short economic recession has a social 
movement of unemployed people emerged.  Therefore, the general economic framework 
produced by the 1995 short recession cannot entirely explain the growth and endurance of the 
piquetero movement. 
Finally, the lack of flexibility and the high regulation of the Argentine labor market 
deserve deeper analysis.  Regulation has tended to raise labor costs, create barriers to entry, 
and introduce rigidities in the employment structure in Latin America. According to 
Alejandra Cox Edwards (1997), there are four areas of direct intervention by government in 
the labor market.  These areas consist of wage determination, including collective bargaining 
and dispute resolution; job security legislation; mandatory contributions to social security; 
and subsidies for workers training.  Such labor market regulations make formal employment 
more expensive and thus, these state interventions contribute to an over-expansion of 
precarious forms of temporary employment or informal employment, a feature of the 
piquetero movement.  Finally, these regulations hinder countries from responding rapidly to 
new challenges from increased foreign competition.   
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In the Argentine case, some scholars such as Guillermo Mondino and Silvia Montoya 
(2000) have blamed Argentinas persistent high rate of formal unemployment on an 
increasingly binding lack of market flexibility in the area of labor regulations.  In particular, 
severance payment regulations hurt employment decisions.  Thus, firms substitute workers 
for a more intensive use of hours.  In addition to these regulations, Carola Pessino (1997) 
argues that both the high fixed costs of hiring and the restrictive collective bargaining 
agreements in Argentina have reduced labor demand, and consequently, have increased the 
rate of formal unemployment.  Indeed, the constraints of labor regulations may have 
provided additional incentives for the consolidation of the informal nature of the piquetero 
movement.  
However, Sebastian Edwards and Nora Lustig (1997) argue that this lack of 
flexibility and the high regulation of the Argentine labor market were also present in most 
other Latin American countries.  Thus, Edwards and Lustig state:  
Although reform programs have affected almost every sector, labor markets 
remain highly regulated in most countries.  In the mid-1990s the vast 
majority of Latin American nations continued to rely on labor legislation 
enacted in the 1950s and 1960s or even earlier, favoring employment 
protection, with lifelong job security in the public sector, and taxing labor 
heavily.  As of 1997, only a handful of countries had reformed their labor 
markets in a significant way. It is no exaggeration to say that the labor 
market has been forgotten in Latin Americas economic reform (1).   
 
For Edwards and Lustig, labor market regulations and institutions in most Latin 
American countries remained restrictive in the mid-1990s.  The excessive regulations 
favoring job security, high payroll taxes, and restrictive policies on minimum wages have all 
had a negative effect on market flexibility and employment generation in the formal sector in 
most of the Latin American countries.  Alejandra Cox Edwards (1997) also highlights the 
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excess of labor market regulation in most countries of the Latin American and Caribbean 
region.  These regulations have included detailed conditions for labor contracts for all 
workers in the formal sector: limits to temporary contracts, legal barriers to employer-
initiated dismissal, employer liability in the case of dismissal, vacation days, extensive 
maternity leave, and employer obligation to provide meals, transportation, and 
accommodation. Cox Edwards points out that only Chile, Perú and Colombia have 
introduced broad changes to deregulate their labor markets.  
Yet a comparison between the Argentine labor market and other Latin American 
countries reveals that lack of labor flexibility and the rigid design of formal unemployment 
insurance were characteristic not only of Argentina, but of the region as a whole. Therefore, 
the excessive regulation in the Argentine labor market cannot by itself entirely explain the 
growth and endurance of the piqueteros movement. 
Hence, when applied in isolation as well as from a comparative perspective, none of 
these economic explanations (such as unemployment rates, market regulations, and the 
temporary crisis of 1995) can fully explain the growth and success of the piquetero 
movement in Argentina.  What other factors, then, could explain the growth and endurance 
of the piquetero movement in Argentina? This question poses a challenging puzzle for 
scholars from other disciplines within the social sciences besides economics.  In order to 
explain the growth and endurance of the piquetero movement, we should take into 
consideration the extensive literature that scholars from other social sciences have developed 
on the growth of social movements.  However, as noted earlier, the institutional dynamics 
and mechanisms of the mutually beneficial relationship of the piquetero movement with the 
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Argentine state makes the existing literature incapable of fully explaining the growth and 
endurance of this social movement.  
Therefore, considering this gap in the current literature, how should we explain the 
growth of the piquetero movement under a comparative framework based on Latin America? 
This is the puzzle that this paper attempts to solve.  In spite of this limitation, the current 
literature on social movements represents an ideal starting point to analyze the rise of this 
social phenomenon. 
 This literature developed from other social sciences to explain social movements 
behavior can be divided along two main lines: those concerned with the notion of identity 
and those concerned with strategy and material needs (Cohen, 1985).  In this paper, I employ 
the methodological tools developed by the school focused on strategies and material needs in 
order to explain the growth and endurance of the piquetero social movement. 
 
STRATEGIC FACTORS; APPLYING RATIONAL CHOICE. 
Since the early 1980s, many collective forms of protest in Latin America, especially 
in urban areas, have emerged.  New interests and new ways of doing politics are central to 
these protests. This new wave includes the emergence of peasant movements, agrarian 
reform movements, and student revolutionary movements among others (Escobar & Alvarez, 
1992). Some of these new Latin American social movements have shared two basic 
characteristics.  First, these social movements have emerged primarily in response to material 
demands (Arato, 1992; Baker, 2002; Escobar, 1992; Hellman, 1992).  Related to this feature, 
Judith Hellman (53) argues, Their struggles are principally organized around the satisfaction 
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of basic needs.5  Second, the relationships of these movements with political parties or with 
the state have been tense and characterized by conflict (Calderón, Piscitelli & Reyna, 1992; 
Hellman 1992).  
The piquetero social movement clearly shares the feature of basic needs.  Thus, the 
typical member of the movement is an unemployed Argentine citizen interested in getting 
subsidies to improve his or her precarious conditions of life.  Because of the clear presence of 
these material incentives, the rational choice approach can provide us with the necessary 
methodological tools to evaluate the nature of these needs (as preferences) and their impact 
on the growth and endurance of the piquetero movement.   
Nevertheless, as we will see, the relationship between the piquetero movement and 
the Argentine executive has been mutually beneficial to some extent, and not strictly one of 
confrontation.  The fact of a mutually beneficial relationship and the special institutional 
dynamics between the piquetero social movement and the Argentine state makes the growth 
of the piquetero movement a fascinating case.  Therefore, this case provides us with a new 
framework to understand and study the development of social movements with this feature in 
Latin America. 
Likewise, the basic assumption of power of the political process model based on 
institutions and configurations of power will be useful in order to identify the political causes 
that contributed to the growth of the piquetero movement.6  Thus, my goal is to identify 
                                                
5 Other types of new social movements in Latin America do not share this need-based characteristic. A 
significant portion of contemporary social movement literature is concerned with the emergence of identity-
based movements during the same period, such as womens rights, indigenous rights, and gay rights 
movements. 
6 For example, under this assumption, another group of scholars has been able to identify other causes for the 
emergence of social movements based on institutions and configurations of power. For example, Scott 
Mainwaring (1986), Cathy Schneider (1995), and Miguel Carter (2003) found that the Roman Catholic Church 
has encouraged movement development in several Latin American countries.  For the development of some 
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which institutional arrangements, political actors, and configurations of power contributed to 
the growth and endurance of the piqueteros movement. 
Therefore, I will focus on these two premises provided by the previous literature on 
Latin American social movements: satisfaction of basic needs and the nature of institutional 
arrangements that contribute to the movements growth. Because institutions significantly 
influence individual behavior and help determine the parameters within which choices are 
made and through which preferences are derived, they will provide us with valuable 
information in order to identify the relevant causal relationships in my analysis (March and 
Olsen, 1984; Shepsle and Weingast, 1987).7  In order to understand and analyze the 
interactions among members of the piquetero movement, the institutional arrangements, and 
the other relevant political actors, I find the rational choice approach to be an appropriate 
methodology to employ in exploring the central questions of this puzzle.8  This approach 
focuses its efforts on analyzing strategic behavior of political actors given certain rules or 
institutional constraints.  Finally, the selection of this approach to analyze the growth of the 
piquetero movement becomes well-suited when considering the movements goals: subsidies 
of different types to satisfy basic needs.  The use of subsidies and its impact on an 
economy or polity can be modeled by using the techniques of the rational choice approach.    
                                                                                                                                                  
other social movements in Latin America, the Roman Catholic Church played a central role as an irreplaceable 
ally. 
7 Institutions in this paper are defined as the formal rules that constrain and shape the behavior of individuals 
and political actors, who attempt to maximize their utility as rational actors (North, 1990). 
8 The rational choice approach focuses on the analysis of strategic behavior.  The basic assumption of this 
approach rests on the concept of rationality. Under this concept, individuals always attempt to maximize their 
utility, given their exogenously determined preferences. This association between individuals with their 
preferences is well-defined by Kenneth Shepsle and Mark Bonchet (1997). These scholars consider an 
individual exclusively in terms of the things he or she wants and the things he or she believes. Since political 
behavior is often about making choices, the rational choice approach attempts to explain political outcomes by 
considering how political actors make choices given their preferences, their incentives, their constraints, and 
their desire to maximize their utility. 
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With respect to the external institutional incentives for the piquetero movement, I 
find that the two relevant key political factors that encouraged the piquetero movement are 1. 
- the particular structure of the current ruling party (the Peronist party) and its effects in the 
internal disputes within the executive branch for getting relatively more political rank; and 2. 
- the relationship between the piquetero associations and Argentine labor unions. Although 
political parties and labor unions have influenced the growth of other Latin American social 
movements, I argue that these institutions have played a central role in the sustainability and 
endurance of the piqueteros.  I explore the rationality underlying institutional incentives in 
the following parts of this paper.   
The first interaction: Piqueteros and the Argentine state 
The clientelist demand 
The first interaction that is worthy of more extensive evaluation is that between the 
Peronist party and the piquetero movement.  The piquetero movement emerged when a 
conflict divided the Peronist party. The party had lost cohesion because of the political 
struggle between its two visible caudillos, or leaders: Carlos Menem, who wanted to be 
reelected in 1999, and Eduardo Duhalde, who retained considerable power in the province of 
Buenos Aires and in the Peronist party (Almeyra, 2004; Levitsky 2003.)   
This division within the Peronist party has been explained by several scholars. Thus, 
for example, Kurt Weyland (1999) concludes that the Peronist partys organizational 
structure is inoperative, and that its leaders hold adversarial relationships among themselves 
and personalistic relationships with the Peronist rank.  With a slightly different 
interpretation, Steven Levitsky (2003) points out that the Peronist party is an informal mass 
party with deep roots in working and lower class society.  However, because the party is 
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informally organized and weakly institutionalized, the formal leadership bodies lack 
independent authority and autonomy from the main political leaders.  Thus, with this weak 
and ineffective central bureaucracy, the party fails to integrate all the subunits (the mass) 
or to link them together horizontally.   
During the first years of the piquetero movement, this decentralized and informal 
structure of the ruling party allowed the main political leaders, Menem and Duhalde, to 
accumulate relatively more political power than their competitors, and enabled them to 
execute this power over other agencies, local politicians, and regional governments across the 
Argentine polity (Jones, 1997, 2002).  It seems logical to conclude that the particular 
decentralized structure of the ruling party (Peronist) contributed to the growth and 
consolidation of two main leaders as equilibrium: Duhalde-Menem first, and Duhalde-
Kirchner afterwards. 
The other institutional set of rules that defines the relationship between the national 
leaders and the regional political bosses is determined by Argentine federalism.  In the 
Argentine federal system, a certain portion of fiscal resources is distributed among the 
provinces and local governments (through the law of Coparticipación Federal de 
Impuestos.)9  Through these fiscal laws and financial transfers, local leaders can achieve 
some political autonomy from the Argentine executive.  Because of the existence of these 
rules, Lucinda Benton (2002) argues that national leaders must grant political and fiscal 
benefits to the local leaders of the political parties to succeed in their political careers.  
                                                
9 The Coparticipación Federal is the process by which part of the taxes collected by the central government are 
reallocated to the provinces.  Under this institutional mechanism, the distribution of fiscal resources among the 
provinces is not uniform (Tomassi,  2002).  
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Thus, these benefits and financial resources are constantly negotiated between the 
national leaders and their political bosses.  For example, because of the mechanisms of fiscal 
distribution of resources established by the law of Coparticipación Federal de Impuestos, 
each main leader and his political Peronist allies in the Congress (Senate) can negotiate with 
the local leaders fiscal transfers of financial resources to the provinces. In exchange for these 
fiscal resources, these national political leaders ask the local leaders for support of their 
personal agendas and those of their nearest political allies in the party (Benton, 2002).  
Another source of negotiation between the Peronist partys main leaders and the local 
leaders lies in the latters control of the construction of the local party lists, through closed 
lists.  Due to this institutional rule, Argentine legislators have a strong incentive to keep a 
good relationship with their local party leaders.  Therefore, a main leaders ability to 
influence legislators of his own party also depends on whether the provincial party leaders 
support the administration (Jones, 2005).  All these institutional rules of Argentine federalism 
have made local party leaders, especially governors, crucial players both in provincial 
politics and in the formation of national political coalitions (Monaldi, 2005). 
These constant negotiations and compromises have helped reinforce the relationships 
between the main leaders and the local-level political bosses across the Argentine 
government.  On one hand, the main leaders, Duhalde and Menem, competed with each other 
to achieve support from the regional leaders, and on the other hand, the local leaders fought 
among them for Duhalde or Menems support for their agendas in their jurisdictions. 
It was precisely the division of the ruling party and the federal government into two 
main factions - coupled with its interaction with the piquetero movement and the division of 
the movement into two factions - that made the growth and endurance of this type of 
  
15
movement possible in Latin America.  Thus, under a comparative perspective, there have not 
been ruling parties or Latin American executive branches so clearly divided into two factions 
in the region.  Moreover, as noted later, the presence of some electoral rules in Argentina can 
complete the explanation on the incentives (for party leaders and piquetero leaders) that 
support the mutually beneficial relationship between the state and the piquetero movement.  
This division of the ruling party and the federal government is not only important to 
explain the growth and endurance of the piquetero movement, but also relevant to understand 
the intra-movement dynamics.  Moreover, as I also note later, this decentralized institutional 
dynamics also divided the organizations of the piquetero movement into several 
organizational groups that were aligned with one of the two factions of the federal 
government.10   
Thus, the mutually beneficial relationship between the Argentine state and the 
piquetero movement -- characterized by this institutional dynamics -- cannot be found as a 
relevant feature in other Latin American movements.  What can be found is literature on 
social movements that hold cooperative ties with states (Passy and Giugni, 1998; McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 1998; Koopmans and Statham, 1999).  Nevertheless, there 
is not a specific model or theoretical framework in the previous literature that can explain the 
particular institutional dynamics and mechanisms with two competing factions within the 
ruling party, the executive branch, and the movement.  
Hence, under this decentralized and divided structure of the ruling party and the rules 
of the federal government, Duhaldes main challenge was to avoid Menems reelection and 
                                                
10 See Table 2. 
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to consolidate his power in the Peronist party and Argentine state.11  Thus, the lack of 
cohesion within the Peronist party, the adversarial relationships among leaders, the strength 
of the national leaders, and the informal organization of the ruling party allowed Duhalde to 
pursue these goals.  As Levitsky points out:  
Duhalde began to build a provincial base in 1990, when he created the Federal 
League, which was based on a network of local party and union leaders who 
opposed then Governor CafieroAfter winning the governorship, Duhalde 
based on an alliance between the League and the ex-Cafieristas, who had 
organized the Buenos Aires Peronist League (LIBEPO). 
 
By 1995, not only had the Duhaldista Machine consolidated its influence in the 
Province of Buenos Aires, but also in many bureaucratic dependencies of the Argentine 
federalist state across the provinces.  By obtaining support from a portion of the Peronist 
partys elite, Duhalde could build up his own clientelist network (Oviedo, 2001).  Thus, 
Duhaldes achievement can be explained by the combination of the characteristics of the 
Peronist party and the federal government.  First, the division and decentralization within the 
Peronist party contributed to the division and competition within the federal government 
between the two main leaders.  Then, this division and fragmentation in the federal 
government influenced the direction of the alliances that the regional leaders forged with the 
two main political leaders.  Mariano Tomassi (2002) makes explicit this last mechanism 
when he describes Duhaldes strategies: 
First in fighting Menem's reelection bid, and then in fighting the interparty 
presidential competition as the Peronist candidate, Duhalde made generous 
use of the largest budget in the country, that of the province of Buenos 
                                                
11 Barbara Geddes (1994) introduces the powerful assumption in the rational choice literature that conceives of 
the state as a collection of self-interested political leaders. Geddes model considers politicians and bureaucrats 
to be rational individuals who attempt to maximize career success, based on certain preferences.  Thus, for 
example, for party leaders, Geddes (1993, 169) states, Party leaders further their careers by increasing the 
electoral success of their parties and by achieving greater influence within their parties. Many of their goals will 
thus coincide with those of politicians in their parties, since both politicians and party leaders benefit from 
policies that give their party electoral advantages. 
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Aires.  Given the importance of the province, and the federal fiscal linkages 
emphasized in this paper, those actions had dire consequences for 
Argentina. 
 
 Thus, in order to avoid Menems reelection and to strengthen his political base, 
Duhalde viewed the growth and endurance of the piqueteros movement as presenting a 
vehicle for achieving these goals through patronage and strategic alliance-building.  Through 
these alliances and patronage, Duhaldes ultimate goal was to buy votes to ensure favorable 
results in electoral periods.  The effectiveness of this strategy has been carefully analyzed by 
Susan Stokes, Valeria Brusco, and Marcelo Nazareno (2004).  In survey research conducted 
in Argentina, Stokes, Brusco, and Nazareno found a significant correlation between 
clientelistic policies and voting behavior.  To explain this outcome, these scholars point out 
that people receiving gifts and subsidies are focused on parties programmatic appeals rather 
than on past performance in deciding how to vote.  This machines ability to hold voters 
accountable for their votes was called preserve accountability by Susan Stokes (2005).  
Several assumptions are required in order to achieve a parsimonious analysis of the 
interaction between Menem and Duhalde, and its results.  First, I assume that Duhalde was 
the incumbent within the Peronist party.  On the other hand, Menem was the challenger who 
attempted to increase his political base and votes for his reelection.  Second, I also assume 
perfect information between the two political actors---Menem and Duhalde.  Then the 
situation may be modeled as the following extensive game with perfect information: 
Players: Menem (the challenger) and Duhalde (the incumbent). 
Terminal histories: (Menem decides to compete, acquiesce), (Menem decides to 
compete, fight), and Menem decides not to compete. 
Player function: P(Ø)=Challenger (Menem) vs. P(In)=Incumbent (Duhalde) 
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Preferences:  
- The challengers preferences are represented by the payoff function U1 (Menem 
decides to compete, acquiesce)= UM3,  
- U1 (Menem decides to compete, fight)= UM2 
- U1 (Menem decides not to compete)=UM1,  
- The incumbents preferences are represented by the payoff function U2 for which 
U2 (Menem decides to compete, acquiesce)= UD3,  
- U1 (Menem decides to compete, fight)= UD2, and  
- U1 (Menem decides not to compete)=UD1 
The game is readily illustrated in the following diagram: 
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The small circle at the top of the diagram represents the start of the game (the empty 
history). The label above this circle indicates that the challenger chooses an action at the 
start of the game (P(Ø)=Challenger). The two branches labeled In and Out represent the 
challengers choices. The branch labeled In leads to a small black disk, the label beside 
which indicates that Duhalde (the incumbent) takes an action after the history In (that is, 
P(In)=Incumbent).  The two branches emanating from the disk represent the incumbents 
choices, Acquiesce or Fight. The pair of symbols ((UM2, UD2) and (UM3, UD3)) beneath 
each terminal history gives the players payoffs to that history, with Menems payoff listed 
first.   
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Because of Menems final entrance in the competition for political support for his re-
election from the piquetero associations, I can deduce that the threat created by Duhalde to 
impede Menems competition was not credible.  Thus, Menem could anticipate that Duhalde 
would remain within the Peronist party (M=1, because of UD3>UD2). Then, Menem 
determined that his own payoff would exceed the payoff in case Menem had decided not to 
compete for this political market (UM3>UM). This outcome is a sub-game Nash 
equilibrium, in which both leaders compete with each other for political rank within the 
Peronist party.12 
Therefore, by competing, Menem and Duhalde strengthened political clientelism by 
providing food and subsidies to as many different sectors as they could.13  Also, because 
there were no substantial claims for substantial structural changes in the Argentine state from 
the piquetero associations, Menem and Duhalde felt comfortable in continuing their 
clientelist strategies to gain more political support from this new and potential political 
market.  This competition reshaped the nature of alliances between several political bosses 
at various levels of the Argentine government and the leaders of key groups in civil society. 
New emerging leaders, organizing masses of unemployed people, found this political 
competition particularly attractive.14 Therefore, the emergence of the piqueteros in 1995 
                                                
12 This sub-game Nash equilibrium also represents the equilibrium derived from the maximization of an 
intertemporal Bellman (1958) equation for both leaders and for every period.  Thus, the partial solution (for the 
clientelist demand) is represented by M*=1 for every period, a sequence of decision rules for {NDUHALDE*}, 
and a sequence of decision rules for {NMENEM*}. This solution also satisfies the budget constraints of both 
leaders. 
13 Gay (1990) defines political clietelism as the distribution of resources (or promise of) by political office 
holders or political candidates in exchange for political support, primarilyalthough not exclusivelyin the 
form of the vote.  
14 Felipe Auyero (2000) argues that the experience of clientelism in Argentina proved to be a decisive factor in 
the workings of hierarchical social arrangements between contemporary Peronism and its clients. Thus, Auyero 
states, The structure of relations among brokers, clients, inner circles, and state officials as well as the location 
of individual actors in the network are the bases for exploring their behavior, perceptions, and attitudes. 
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coincided with the division and conflict within the Peronist party, but not with a radical 
change in the social programs previously implemented by the former President Raúl 
Alfonsín. 
It is also important to point out that the co-optation of the piqueteros was also 
facilitated by social linkages that bind unionists and Peronism.  These social linkages were 
mainly forged during periods of shared adversity and struggle against military rule (Levitzky 
& Way, 1998).  Steven Levitzky and Lucan Way add,  
a clear example is the relationship between Carlos Menem and CGT leaders 
Diego Ibanez and Lorenzo Miguel, with whom Menem was detained after the 
1976 military coup. Menem and Ibanez shared a cell during the three years they 
spent in prison together.  
 
 Because the piquetero leaders have previously been leaders or key members of labor 
unions, several of these leaders could also maintain personal relationships with influential 
members of the Peronist party (Almeyra, 2004).  This fact also could have contributed to a 
more efficient process of co-optation by reducing the transactional costs of the process. 
Finally, according to Levitzky and Way, union dependence on the Peronist party (and on the 
State) is quite pronounced in Argentina.  To support this argument, Levitzky and Way argue, 
Financially, only a small fraction of union income is derived from membership dues, and 
therefore, most unions rely heavily on resources over which the government exercises at least 
some discretion. By providing more information and, consequently more predictability, 
these financial procedures -- already common and recurrent -- could also reduce the 
transactional costs in the bargaining process between the piquetero leaders and the Peronist 
leader. 
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The same scheme previously framed for Menem and Duhalde could also be applied to 
analyze the interaction between President Néstor Kirchner and Eduardo Duhalde.  Likewise, 
Duhalde plays the role of incumbent and Kirchner, the role of entrant (the challenger for 
gaining political rank).  When Néstor Kirchner assumed the presidency in 2003, he lacked 
significant political support from his own political party (Partido Peronista or Justicialista). 
Most of the Peronist political bosses were aligned with the other strong leader of the Peronist 
party---the former President Eduardo Duhalde.  However, in the year since taking office, 
Kirchner has attempted to forge solid political support in order to consolidate a greater 
margin of political autonomy within the Argentine government.  The piquetero movement 
has clearly represented a tool to achieve this goal.  Moreover, due to the suddenly high (and 
increasing) rates of unemployment and social decomposition of Argentine society produced 
by the deep economic crisis of 2002,15 Kirchner saw the co-optation of the increasing mass of 
unemployed as an opportunity to avoid or minimize any generalized dissatisfaction with his 
government. 
Nevertheless, Kirchners efforts to achieve more political power have created a 
permanent conflict of interest with Duhaldes supporters within the Argentine government 
and the Peronist party.  Also, although the origin of the piquetero movement was strongly 
influenced by the Menem-Duhalde rivalry, its expansion and consolidation were in part 
intensified by the Duhalde-Kirchner rivalry.16 
The division of the piquetero movement into two political branches and several 
associations demonstrates the considerable level of influence of the Peronist party with its 
                                                
15 See Parodi (2003). 
16 We must also consider the effects of the acute and deep economic crisis that Argentina experienced in 2001 
and 2002. 
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caudillos Menem and Duhalde, and then with Kirchner and Duhalde in shaping the 
piquetero movement.  Each branch of the piquetero movement openly supports one of the 
two most powerful Argentine caudillos, Kirchner or Duhalde.17   Moreover, the division 
within the piquetero movement into several associations also suggests to us that the network 
of social and personal relationships between the piquetero leaders and Peronist leaders also 
shaped the movement.  Because the network of social alliances and personal relationships is 
usually decentralized and dispersed, this could explain why each branch of the piquetero 
movement is not cohesive and contains different organizations. Thus, certain former 
unionists with relevant linkages to leaders of the Peronist party could have received more 
attention than others from any branch of the ruling party. This fact could explain their 
personal emergence as piquetero leaders.  
Table 2 compiles the division of power within the piquetero movement (see 
Appendix).  Notably, there is no publicly official data on the activities of the piqueteros, so 
the following is based on data reported to the press by leaders of various factions of the 
movement. However, data from table 2 provides us with some idea of the final optimal 
number of piqueteros chosen by Duhalde and Kirchner: NDUHALDE* = 80,940, and 
NKIRCHNER*= 82,000.  
The clientelist supply 
 In the piquetero organization, the piquetero leaders are the intermediaries between the 
State and the members. Again, because the leaders in the ruling party are attempting to 
maximize political support, they have each granted several concessions to the piquetero 
leaders through their respective political bosses who are variously situated throughout the 
                                                
17 La Nación, November 30, 2005 
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Argentine government (Escudé, 2005).  Due to these concessions, the piquetero leaders have 
been favored with a certain level of political autonomy and influence.  The piquetero leaders 
enjoy their power thanks to the subsidies, food, and temporary job opportunities that they 
receive from different factions within the Argentine government.   
I will assume that the leaders attempt to increase their level of autonomy and political 
power through participating in the movement. For this purpose, they channel as many 
resources as they can from the State to the members of their associations.  By doing this, the 
leaders try to incorporate as many members as they can into their respective associations.18  
To succeed, the leaders must consider the individual utility maximization of their 
members.  This calculation is based on the rational choice theory of economist Marcur Olson 
(1971), which focused on the weighing of costs and benefits, rather than ideologies and 
grievances.  Under this concept of rationality, the individual will adopt a course of action that 
yields the highest expected utility, where the expected utility of any action is the sum of the 
individuals valuations of the possible outcomes multiplied by the probability that these 
outcomes will occur if the individual chooses the given course of action (Salert, 1976).  
However, Olsons collective action theory has been criticized because it does not solve the 
problem of free rider behavior in the theory of public goods as it relates to the case of 
revolutions.19  Barbara Salert (26) outlines this dilemma quite succinctly,  
This problem typically arises when the group of people interested in the public 
good is large. In this case, the contributions of any single individual toward 
supplying the public good may be expected to be small-so small, in fact as to 
                                                
18 Therefore, I assume the following: 
If n is the number of members and Uleader(n+) is the utility function of a piquetero leader (the payoff is 
defined by the level of autonomy and political power), then  Uleader(n+1) > Uleader(n). 
19 Free riders attempt to get accessed to the provision of a certain good without any cost.  Because any 
entrepreneur or the state cannot discriminate among customers when they provide public goods, the customers 
try to consume the good and avoid any payment.  
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be virtually negligible. For example, the average potential revolutionary 
probably expects to have very little impact either on the probability of the 
success of the revolution to fail if he does not participate and succeed if he 
does. If this is the case, the individual is in a situation in which, given the 
nature of public goods, the probability of his receiving the good (in this case, 
the results of a revolution) is not dependent of his actions.  
 
Nevertheless, for Salert, the weaknesses of Olsons theory disappear when private 
goods (goods for which exclusion is possible) or selective incentives (for example, 
subsidies) are attached to the public good so that the individual cannot obtain the private 
good, unless he simultaneously helps to provide the public good.  Thus, for the piquetero 
case, the piquetero leaders have been able to solve the problem of free rider by monitoring 
closely the piquetero members activities and participation in the movement (Svampa & 
Pereyra, 2003; Escudé, 2005).  The goal was to convert a potential public good into a private 
good to solve this problem of collective action (Taylor, 1990).  Thus, by granting private 
property rights through monetary allowances (participation in exchange for the subsidy), the 
piquetero leaders ensured the active participation of their members and the consolidation of 
their power. 
The special design of the electoral rules in Argentina can also help to explain the 
growth and endurance of the movement when considering the role played by the piquetero 
leaders.  Although the 1985 Political Parties Law requires that Argentine political parties 
have democratic elections for intra-party leadership positions, this law does not force 
political parties to choose candidates for public office.  In the election of these leaders, three 
methods of candidate selection were employed by the political parties between 1983 and 
2001: elite arrangement (imposition of a list by a caudillo), assembly election, and direct 
primary election.   
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The overwhelming majority of candidates in Latin America are usually chosen by 
elite arrangement, with a few exceptions (De Luca, Jones, and Tula, 2002). These rare 
primary elections took place in Mexico (Partido Revolucionario Institucional in 1999), 
Honduras (Partido Nacional in 1996), and Costa Rica (Partido de Liberacion Nacional in 
1997).  Therefore, under a comparative perspective, the two types of intra-party elections  
assembly election and direct primary election - have been only present in Argentina among 
the countries with relatively high rates of unemployment such as Colombia, Nicaragua, and 
Panama. 
According to Miguel De Luca, Mark Jones, and Maria Ines Tula (2002), when 
elections take place, every list tries to obtain the strong support of its own machinery 
composed of regional or neighborhood leaders.  In addition, every list needs other organized 
groups with strong ability to mobilize large numbers of people.  To maximize the likelihood 
of being elected in these intra-party elections, the potential cooptation of the piqueteros was a 
price that Peronist politicians could not afford to evade. 
Therefore, the design of the electoral system in Argentina can also help to understand 
why the Peronist leaders decided to privatize public goods through working with the 
piqueteros, and not with citizens at large.  Thus, it was rational and politically profitable for 
Peronist leaders to distribute part of their available public subsidies through the piquetero 
leaders instead of distributing the totality of their resources to buy votes at the national level.  
For a parsimonious analysis, I assume that members in the piqueteros movement are 
identical (homogeneity of preferences). The benefits that each member receives from 
belonging to the movement include subsidies (s represents the amount of allowance for each 
member of the piquetero movement) through monetary allowances, food, and temporary 
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jobs. A members consumption of private goods is represented by Y. Therefore, a 
representative members taste is represented by a utility function, 
U = U ( Y, s)       (1) 
I also assume that the utility function satisfies standard requirements such as 
nonsatiation (an increase in either good will augment utility), convexity of the indifference 
curves, and being twice continuously differentiable.  Then each member attempts to 
maximize utility subject to a budget constraint, 
F ( Y, s, C ) = I = Y + Gi ( S, Ci)/Ci, 20                      (2) 
where I is the individuals income, the price of the private good is unity, S is the total amount 
of subsidies available for any of the piquetero associations, Gi(.) is the cost function of any of 
the piquetero associations, and Ci is the membership size of any of the piquetero 
associations.  The costs of the piquetero associations will depend positively on both the size 
of the total amount of subsidies and the number of members.  To find the optimal provision 
and membership requirements, a representative member is depicted as maximizing his or her 
utility function.  The first order condition is as follows: 
 Us / Uy  = Gs / Ci           (3) 
 In addition to this condition (3), an individual joins the association or remains within 
it because the total utility of joining or remaining within the association exceeds the total 
utility of remaining unemployed and without membership.  Thus, in equations (2) and (3), 
each value of s determines a different number of piqueteros interested in joining a 
piquetero association. The total number of individuals interested in joining the movement 
                                                
20 The model presented here to explain members behavior is a slight variation of the one used by McGuire 
(1974) for modeling clubs. 
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with a particular value of s determines the total supply function for the Argentine polity: 
Ntotal-supply= f(s). 
Linking demand and supply 
  Considering the interaction between the clientelist supply and the clientelist demand, 
the next step in this analysis is to integrate both partial analyses into one solution for the 
Argentine political market (between the state and the piquetero associations). This 
equilibrium solution is defined as follows: 
- M =1 for every period, 
- The sequence of decision rules for the two main leaders and all the piquetero members 
(households) satisfies this equation for every period.  
NLEADER 1* + NLEADER 2*= Ntotal-demand** = Ntotal-supply**     (for every  period) 
where N** represents the equilibrium for the number of piqueteros co-opted by the 
Argentine leaders. Thus, for example, according to our available data, the N** was 162,940 
in 2004, and S** (subsidy) was 150 pesos per month in 2004 and 2005.21  
The model in a comparative perspective 
 The model described in this paper and the assumptions about the structure of the 
ruling party can provide us with the framework to understand the growth and endurance of 
such a movement in a Latin American polity.  Thus, the presence of a strong conflict and 
competition between the two most powerful caudillos within the ruling party contributed 
powerfully to the success and endurance of the piquetero movement.22   
                                                
21 See Clarín (July 14, 2004, page 10), Bleta (2005), and La Nación, (2005, November 13.) 
22 For parsimonious purposes, this model only analyzes the effect of one particular organizational structure 
within the ruling party in order to explain the emergence of a movement of this kind in Argentina. Thus, the 
model predicts outcomes in the presence or the absence of this structure.  However, this model does not account 
  
29
 Therefore, on the one hand, under the presence of a hegemonic leadership, leaders 
prefer to grant subsidies and buy votes without the costs of supporting a distinct social 
movement.23   On the other hand, however, under tough competition between the two main 
factions within the ruling party (Peronist), Argentine political leaders preferred to tolerate the 
political costs imposed by a distinct movement due to its continuous violations of the 
Argentine law, to support its endurance with subsidies, and to permit the formation and 
strengthening of its particular identity -- the piquetero identity.  
 Recent statistics on the evolution of the piquetero movement confirm this statement.  
Because of the decline of Duhaldism within the Peronist party after Kirchner took office in 
2003, competition between the two main leaders of the Peronist party has been weakening 
since 2003.  Duhaldes opposition to Kirchner was effective until 2005, when Kirchner 
challenged Duhaldes domination in the province of Buenos Aires and defeated him.  
Duhaldism is residual now within Peronism (Calvo, 2005).  In fact, Duhaldism was routed in 
the last election of 2005, when it lost even in such enclaves as Avellaneda, Florencia Varela, 
San Miguel, Almirante Brown, Lomas de Zamora and Quilmes, traditionally loyal to 
Duhalde and his allies.  In addition, Duhalde himself is semi-retired, and he currently lives in 
Montevideo. 
 This decline in the levels of competition within Peronism has coincided with a 
significant reduction in the activities of the movement, measured by the number of 
                                                                                                                                                  
for the effect of other emerging incentives or institutional arrangements that might produce the emergence of a 
movement of unemployed people in other Latin American countries.  
23 Such a social phenomenon is being seen in Venezuela with the installation of the Bolivarian committees.  
In this case, the Venezuelan executive branch prefers to grant subsidies and buy votes without supporting a 
dictint social movement, which could produce more autonomy for the movements leaders (intermediaries) and 
reinforce a potentially troublesome distinct identity. 
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roadblocks (Massetti, 2006; Consuasor, 2006).24  Furthermore, the structure of piquetero 
alliances has suffered an important transformation: the piquetero movement is no longer 
divided in two main factions.  The number of alliances, factions, and political affiliations of 
the piquetero associations has multiplied and diversified (Massetti, 2006).  To sum up, the 
decline in the levels of competition and the changes within the structure of the Peronist party 
-- with the decline of Duhaldism -- have affected the activity and the structure of the 
piquetero movement. 
 Although some empirical studies provide us with some information on the relationship 
between the amount of workfare benefits and number of strikes (roadblocks) or the impact of 
political affiliation (with the president) on the amount of workfare benefits; these works, 
nevertheless, do not address the growth and endurance of the piquetero movement from a 
comparative perspective based on Latin America (Lodola, 2005; Franceschelli & Ronconi, 
2005; Weitz-Shapiro, 2006; Giraudy, 2007).  Moreover, these studies do not evaluate the 
effects of the intra-party competition within Peronism, and consequently, within the 
Argentine government (at the federal or provincial level).      
 Without this empirical exercise, it is not possible to answer different questions.  Thus, 
for example, these studies cannot explain why Argentine leaders prefer to practice 
clientelism through supporting the growth of a social movement with greater political 
autonomy and a distinct identity (the piquetero identity).  Furthermore, these studies cannot 
explain why the growth and long endurance of an urban social movement that has kept a dual 
relationship with the state -- conflictive (due to its roadblocks), and mutually beneficial 
(political ranks and electoral support for politicians in exchange of subsidies) -- has been 
                                                
24 The number of piquetes (roadblocks) fell down by 8% in 2004 and 13% in 2005 (Massetti, 2006). The 
amount of piquetes continued to decline during 2006 (Consuasor, 2006). 
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successful in Argentina but not in other Latin American countries.  Other attempts to 
organize a movement of the unemployed or with low income populations with this dual 
relationship have failed or have had short lives.  Clear examples have been the piquetero 
attempts to replicate its movement in Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia.25   
 However, for further research, I suggest quantifying the impact of the rivalry within 
the Peronist party on the activities (number of roadblocks) and the amount of workfare spent 
on the movement by the Argentine state.  Although this study cannot allow us to analyze the 
piquetero movement from a comparative perspective, with Latin America as a framework, 
this exercise could quantitatively determine the role and participation of the Argentine 
institutions addressed in this study on the growth and endurance of the piquetero movement.  
 
The second interaction: The piqueteros social movement and the Argentine labor unions 
The second interaction that is also worthy of more extensive evaluation is the one 
found between the Argentine labor unions and the piquetero movement.  This interaction is 
characterized by a supportive relationship between the Argentine labor unions and the 
piquetero movement.  The current support of the former for the latter can also be explained 
using the basic assumption of rationality.  Because labor unions intend to provide their 
associate members with high salaries and wages, these organizations always attempt to keep 
the labor supply low.  Basic economic theory predicts that a contraction in the labor supply 
would increase wages in any labor market.  Therefore, the permanence and consolidation of 
                                                
25 Consult http://bolivia.indymedia.org/es/2004/09/11872.shtml,  
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2004/09/16/elpais/p-01802.htm , and 
http://www.sindicatomercosul.com.br/noticia02.asp?noticia=17765 
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the piquetero members as an unemployed mass of people would favor the unions long-term 
goal of high salaries or wages in the formalized labor sector. 
In exchange for remaining unemployed, the piquetero movement gains the political 
support of labor unions. In addition, the piquetero receive organizational support.  For 
example, Luis DElia, leader of the piquetero association Federación Tierra y Vivienda 
(FTV), said in an interview that the association of his organization with the labor union 
Central de Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA) was convenient.26  For DElía, the piquetero 
movement achieved both unemployment insurance and its institutionalization with the 
political support of the unions.  Moreover, DElia added that because of the implementation 
of this unemployment insurance, the labor unions achieved higher wages for their members 
(Almeyra, 148).   
The economic explanation for this relationship is simple.  In the context of an 
economic crisis, wages tend to experience a reduction because of a contraction in the demand 
of labor, and at the same time, a very likely expansion in the supply of labor.  The expansion 
in the supply of labor can occur due to a reduction in the reservation wage, a product of the 
economic crisis through fewer available jobs and increased needs for cash.27  The strategy 
employed by labor unions with its support was to increase the reservation wages of the 
piqueteros through more organizational support and political pressure.  Thus, the final goal 
                                                
26 The piquetero association FTV is now part of the labor union Central de Trabajadores Argentinos. Ana 
Dinerstein (2003) describes accurately this relationship, The FTV leaders became members of the executive 
committee of the union and both manage the unemployment programmes for the region.   In addition, the labor 
union Central de Trabajadores Argentinos has close relations with the Corriente Combativa Clasista. 
(Rauber, 2002; Dinerstein, 2003). According to table 2, the piquetero associations Federación Tierra y 
Vivienda (FTV) and the Corriente Combativa Clasista are the most important piquetero associations in terms 
of the number of social plans that they manage. 
27 According to the literature, the reservation wage makes workers indifferent between accepting a job or 
remaining unemployed (Ljungqvist & Sargent, 2004).  
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of the unions with these actions was to secure and potentially increase the transfer of 
subsidies from the executive to the movement.  
Like the FTV, and as noted earlier, the other piquetero associations also have strong 
linkages with leaders of several Argentine labor unions (Dinerstein, 2001; Patroni, 2002; 
Rauber, 2002; Almeyra, 2004).  These linkages have allowed piquetero leaders and unionists 
to build cooperative relations.  Considering the high rates of Argentine unemployment, and 
the dimensions of the formal and informal sector in the Argentine economy, this group of 
leaders (associated, in general, with labor unions) has been able to segment the market 
between unions of workers and unemployed people and thus, to maximize political rank.  
This segmentation has also helped this elite among unionists compensate, to some extent, for 
the loss of influence and organizational power it experienced during Menems government 
(Levitzky & Way, 1998).28  Thus, this strategic association between labor unions and 
piqueteros could be considered a positive-sum equilibrium for both social networks.  
CONCLUSIONS 
 Several lessons can be obtained from this study.  First, among the conventional 
approaches used to explain the growth and consolidation of social movements, an analysis 
based on rational choice foundations is particularly well-suited to explain the growth and 
endurance of the piquetero movement.  The material interests of the members of the 
piquetero social movement and the importance of the relationship between the piquetero 
movement and some of the Argentine institutional arrangements -- in this case, the ruling 
party and the labor unions -- are most accurately reflected through this type of approach.   
                                                
28 Menems government usually used its discretionary power to discipline confrontational unions and reward 
supportive ones. These strategies diminished unions power and enabled Menems government to privatize 
several public enterprises (Levitzky & Way, 1998). 
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 Second, because the purposes of the piquetero social movement are mainly clientelist 
(i.e., to obtain material benefits for members and political autonomy for the leaders of the 
movement), the development of this movement has followed a different pattern from most 
other traditional Latin American social movements.  Other scholars such as Jean Cohen and 
Andrew Arato (1992), Gideon Baker (2002), Judith Hellman (1992), and Sonia Alvarez & 
Arturo Escobar (1992) have already alerted us to the emergence and growth of this wave of 
new social movements in Latin America, which in several cases are more interested in 
demanding economic and social concessions from the state than from the capitalist 
employers.   
 Third, the development of the piquetero social movement is connected to the political 
structures of the Argentine ruling party and the rules of the Argentine federalism.  For this 
movement, I find clear causal relationships: when the ruling party is more decentralized and 
divided into two competing political heads, the piquetero associations become 
correspondingly stronger and more consolidated.  The more intense the competition is 
between the two main leaders, the stronger the piquetero movement becomes.  This is a case 
in which the combination of this particular institutional arrangement with a high 
unemployment rate could create a distinct social movement of unemployed people like the 
piquetero movement.  The Argentine economic crisis, the co-optation of the unemployed as 
an opportunity to avoid popular dissatisfaction, the Argentine electoral rules, and the 
connections of Argentine labor unions with the piquetero associations also triggered this 
political phenomenon. 
 Fourth, these findings and correlations again place in question the traditional 
conception of civil society as the purveyor of democracy in Latin America.  There has clearly 
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been a bias among many scholars to focus exclusively on the contributions of a mobilized 
civil society when it is involved in attempting to bring about or strengthen liberal democracy 
(Baker, 2002).  However, this tendency is seriously challenged by new empirical findings. 
These empirical contributions have shown that civil society does not necessarily support 
democracy, and has in some cases pushed for alternative forms of government (Berman, 
1997).  As a result, one should be cautious from believing wholesale in the myth of a 
virtuous civil society that is always on the side of good governance (Salazar, 1999; Rucht, 
2003).   
 Within the Latin American context, in Argentina, there has been a dual interaction 
between the piquetero social movement and the two heads of the ruling party (caudillos).  
The final result has been more clientelism, increasing conflict and disunity within the main 
political party in Argentina (the Peronist party), and the strengthening of the power of the 
caudillos in the Argentine polity.  Venezuela offers a similar example.  In this country, the 
present-day conflict also defies traditional assumption about the role of social movements in 
democratization.  The 1999 Bolivarian Constitution legitimized civil societys insertion into 
the political sphere through plebiscitary measures and citizen-initiated processes.  However, 
the institutionalization of Venezuelan civil society did not lead to the building of a 
common collective interest. On the contrary, this form of participatory democracy - 
coupled with the discredit of the traditional Venezuelan political parties - has increased 
political conflicts and might weaken democracy (García-Guadilla, Mallén & Guillén, 2004).  
 Both the recent Argentine and Venezuelan experiences raise relevant questions for 
further discussion and research.  First, civil society can be easily co-opted by state actors 
through the offering of subsidies and material help. Building this assumption into my 
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analysis, I have shown that sectors of the executive branch can easily calculate and set a 
small enough allowance per individual in order to accumulate a substantial level of 
political support from civil society.  However, unlike the Argentine case, political leaders in 
most other countries prefer to grant subsidies and buy votes without the costs of supporting a 
distinct social movement.  For example, in the absence of a division and competition within 
the Venezuelan ruling party, the executive branch prefers to grant subsidies and buy votes 
without supporting a distinct social movement, which could produce more political autonomy 
for the movements leaders and reinforce a potentially troublesome distinct identity. 
 Because the members of the target groups are usually poor or unemployed people 
(high marginal utility for a small allowance), the Argentine experience teaches us that the 
structure of preferences and their limited budgets of these individuals facilitates their 
cooptation.  Second, the impact of civil society on the performance of the Latin American 
democracies directly depends on how civil society interacts with the political system, the 
design of institutions, and the incentives that institutions generate in a polity.  
 Finally, due to the similar economic and social conditions among the Latin American 
countries, I could generalize the central explanation developed in this paper for Argentina to 
predict the growth and endurance of this kind of social movement in other Latin American 
countries.  After relaxing the assumption related to the division and competition within the 
ruling party, a distinct social movement -- with a mutually beneficial relationship with the 
state -- is not an outcome under this scenario.  Thus, leaders might prefer to practice 
clientelism without supporting the growth of a social movement with greater political 
autonomy and a distinct identity.     
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 In a first test, for example, this analysis could explain the recent failure of the 
piqueteros to develop new networks in Uruguay.  This Southern Cone country shares many 
of the features of the Argentine context: economic crisis, high rates of unemployment, and a 
relatively inflexible labor market.  However, without the clear division of power into two 
competing parts within the ruling party, the growth of a new piquetero social movement has 
been unsuccessful.  The piquetero leaders also tried unsuccessfully to expand the movement 
to other Latin American countries such as Paraguay and Bolivia.  All these failed attempts 
also provide the necessary basis for comparison and for testing the empirical validity of this 
model.   
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Unemployment rates in Latin American countries 
Country 
 
1990
* 
 
1991
* 
 
1992
* 
 
1993
* 
 
1994
* 
 
1995
* 
 
1996
** 
 
1997
** 
 
1998
** 
 
1999
** 
 
2000 
** 
2001 
** 
2002 
** 
2003 
** 
Argentina 
 7.5 6.5 7.0 9.6 11.5 18.6 17.2 14.9 12.9 14.3 
15.1 17.4 19.7 15.0 
Bolivia 
 
9.5 7.3 5.8 5.4 5.8  3.8 4.4 6.1 7.2 7.5 8.5 8.7 9.5 
Brazil 
 
4.3 4.8 5.8 5.4 5.1 4.7 5.4 5.7 7.6 7.6 7.1 6.2 7.1  
Chile 
 
6.5 7.3 5.0 4.1 6.3 5.6 6.4 6.1 6.4 9.8 9.2 9.1 9.0 8.5 
Colombia 
 
10.5 10.2 10.2 8.6 8.9 8.6 11.2 12.4 15.3 19.4 17.2 18.2 17.6 16.7 
Nicaragua 
 
11.1 14.2 17.8 21.8 20.7 20.2 16.0 14.3 13.2 10.7 9.8 10.5 11.6 10.2 
Panama 
 
20.0 19.3 17.5 15.5 15.8 14.3 14.3 13.2 12.7 11.8 13.5 14.0 13.5 12.8 
Peru 
 
8.3 5.9 9.4 9.9 8.8 8.2 8.0 9.2 8.5 
 
9.2 8.5 9.3 9.4 9.4 
Paraguay 
 
6.6 5.1 5.3 5.1 4.6 4.8 8.2 7.1 6.6 9.4 10.0 10.8 14.7 11.2 
Uruguay 
 
9.3 8.9 9.0 8.4 9.1 10.7 11.9 11.5 10.1 11.3 13.6 15.3 17.0 16.9 
Venezuela 
 
11.0 10.1 8.1 6.8 8.7 10.3 11.8 11.4 11.3 15.0 13.9 13.3 15.8 18.0 
Sources: * ECLAC 1995. Urban unemployment rates 
** ECLAC. Unemployment rates 
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Table 2. The social movement in numbers 
ALLIED WITH DUHALDE (the duros) 
Corriente Clasista y Combativa (CCC) 
Leader: Juan Carlos Alderete  
Political affiliation: Partido Comunista 
Revolucionario 
Members: 70,000 
               Beneficiaries of social plans: 50,000 
 
ALLIED WITH KIRCHNER (the blandos or 
kirchneristas) 
Federación Tierra y Vivienda (FTV) 
Leader: Luis DElía 
Political affiliation: Central de 
Trabajadores Argentinos. 
Members: 125,000 
Beneficiaries of social plans: 75,000 
Public dining rooms: 2,000 
 
Movimiento Independiente de Jubilados y 
Desocupados (MIJD) 
Leader: Raul Castells 
Members: 60,000 
Beneficiaries of social plans: 7,000  
               Public dining rooms: 1,052 
 
Polo Obrero 
Leader: Néstor Pritola 
Political affiliation: Partido Obrero (PO) 
Members: 25,000 
Beneficiaries of social plans: 20,000 
              Public dining rooms: 560 
 
Coordinadora de Unidad Barrial (CUBA) 
Leader: Oscar Kuperman 
Members: 4,680 
Beneficiaries of social plans: 1,140 
              Public dining rooms: 28 
 
Barrios de Pie 
Leader: Jorge Ceballos 
Political affiliation: Patria Libre 
Members: 60,000 
Beneficiaries of social plans: 7,000 
               Public dining rooms: 800 
  
 
Frente de Trabajadores Combativos 
Leader: Ernesto Aldana 
Political affiliation: Movimiento al 
Socialismo (MAS) 
Members: 7,000 
Beneficiaries of social plans: 2,800 
 
Source: La Nación, June 28, 2004. Page 6. This information was provided by the leaders of each organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
